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In the Utah Court of Appeals 
LARRY K. JENKINS. 
Plaintiff, 
KENT PETERSON, an individual, 
TIMOTHY VETERE, an individual, and 
KENT PETERSON AND TIMOTHY 




to Mr. Vetere's Opening Brief 
Docket No. 20030181-CA 
Civil Case No. 0007-47 
Defendant/Appellant Timothy Vetere, by and through his undersigned counsel of record, 
hereby files this Errata Sheet in connection with his Opening Brief in the above-entitled appeal, 
filed on August 7, 2003. 
THE ERRATA 
In preparing his Reply Brief, Mr. Vetere discovered that, through an oversight, he had 
omitted from the Issues & Standards of Review section of his Opening Brief the citations 
indicating where in the record each of the issues on appeal were preserved for appeal. Mr. 
Vetere deeply regrets this omission, and offers the following restatement of his Issues statement 
in reparation: 
Ve828.005—Errata Sheet on the Opening Brief Page 1 of 3 
Issue 1: The central issue in this case is whether the trial court erred in 
denying Defendant/Appellant Timothy Vetere's ("Vetere") motion for summary 
judgment and granting summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff/Appellee Larry K. 
Jenkins ("Jenkins"), and against Vetere, ruling that Jenkins holds a security 
interest in the Subject Property, and ordering foreclosure of the land with all 
proceeds up to $12,000 plus interest going to Jenkins. (R. at 226-30, 331 pp. 
19:11-21:6.) 
Sub-Issue A: Whether the Security Agreement ("Agreement") 
created a security interest in the property where the Agreement only 
provides an assignment of 25% of the proceeds from any sale to Jenkins 
when the land is sold, and where the Trustee, acting for Peterson, sold all 
of Peterson's interest in the Subject Property for $8,000. (R. at 226-27, 
331pp. 19:23-20:20.) 
Sub-Issue B: Whether the alleged security interest secured more 
than the interest in 25% of the selling price where the instrument of 
security did not mention any other obligation. (R. at 227-28,283-84,331 
p. 19:16-20:20.) 
DATED this i\^ day of October, 2003, 
Smith Hartvigsen, PLLC 
J. Craig Smith 
Scott M. Ellsworth 
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Certificate of Service 
On this KH day of October, 2003, two true and correct copies of the foregoing 
Errata Sheet to Mr. Vetere's Opening Brief were mailed, United States mail, postage 
prepaid, to the following: 
David Crabtree, Esq. 
10714 S. Jordan Gateway, Suite 300 
South Jordan, Utah 84095 
Kent Peterson 
9519 South 4030 West, #2 
South Jordan, Utah 84095 
-U 
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Argument 
I. INTRODUCTION 
By focusing on Mr. Peterson's culpability rather than on the plain language and 
efficacy of the Security Agreement ("Agreement"), Mr. Jenkins' Brief misses the central 
issues of this appeal. At no time has Mr. Vetere disputed the fact that Mr. Peterson acted 
dishonestly. In fact, Peterson defrauded Mr. Vetere out of more than ten times the 
amount lost by Mr. Jenkins. Mr. Peterson's bad acts, however, have no relevance to this 
appeal. Instead, the dispositive issue is whether, and if so, to what extent Mr. Jenkins' 
damages are secured by an interest in the Subject Property through the Agreement. 
The court below plainly erred in ordering foreclosure of the Subject Property to 
cover a damage award of $12,000 to Mr. Jenkins. Mr. Jenkins makes four principal 
arguments for affirmance, none of which has any merit. First, Jenkins argues that the 
Bankruptcy Trustee's Quitclaim Deed was explicitly subject to all valid and existing 
liens.1 While the bankruptcy court deferred the determination of the valididty of the liens 
to the state court, this has no impact on the instant case where Jenkins holds no valid lien. 
Second, Jenkins argues that Mr. Vetere raised a new argument on this appeal. Mr. 
Vetere, however, did not raise any new arguments on this appeal. He argued in his 
memoranda and at the summary judgment hearing both that the Agreement was not 
effective in creating a security interest in the Subject Property, and that the amount 
secured by the Subject Property was unascertainable. Third, Jenkins' Brief claims that 
1
 More correctly stated, the validity of all liens, including the purported lien Mr. Jenkins 
allegedly obtained through the Agreement, was expressly deferred by the bankruptcy 
court to the state court to determine. See R. 182, 199. 
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Utah law allows an invalid mortgage—one without a sum certain—to somehow, 
following a breach, morph into a valid mortgage as soon as an amount of damages can be 
ascertained. Finally, Jenkins' claims rely heavily on the assumption that the Agreement 
is ambiguous. To the contrary, the Agreement is plain and unambiguous on its face. 
Thus, no evidence beyond the Agreement can have any impact on the determination of 
the intent of the parties. The Agreement did not convey any fee interest in the Subject 
Property. At a maximum, the plain meaning of the Agreement purports to secure 25% of 
the proceeds from any sale. The sale from the Bankruptcy Trustee for $8,000 would 
qualify as a sale under the Agreement, and the interest of Mr. Jenkins would therefore be 
$2,000. This is the maximum amount possibly secured by the alleged security interest. 
IL THE TRUSTEE'S DEED QUALIFIES AS A SALE UNDER THE 
AGREEMENT, AND THE FACT THAT THE SALE WAS SUBJECT TO A 
DETERMINATION OF LIENS BY THE STATE COURT HAS NO 
IMPACT ON THE OUTCOME OF THIS CASE. 
The Bankruptcy Estate's sale of Peterson's interest to Vetere qualifies as a sale 
under the Security Agreement because the quitclaim deed was subject only to existing 
liens and rights as determined by the state court. Jenkins essentially argues, and the court 
below apparently accepted, that the Bankruptcy Court imputed Jenkins' rights against 
Peterson into rights in the Subject Property. There are two major errors with this 
conclusion: First, the Bankruptcy Court merely reserved for determination by this Court 
2
 While some other jurisdictions allow for uncertainty in the amount owing under a 
mortgage, to ensure an effective recording and notice system in real estate, Utah requires 
a sum certain. 
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Jenkins' existing rights to the land, if any, and did not grant him any new rights. Second, 
even if the quitclaim deed was subject to all liens, Jenkins5 either never held a valid lien, 
or alternatively, his lien was limited to 25% of the proceeds from a sale. 
Jenkins expends considerable effort to prove that the bankruptcy court intended to 
preserve Jenkins' rights to the land. Vetere does not dispute that the Trustee deeded 
Peterson's interest in the Subject Property to him "subject to all liens and interests" so 
that any liens or interests could be determined in state court. However, the phrase 
"subject to all liens and interests" has no effect unless there is a valid and existing lien or 
interest. Jenkins would have the court believe that the Bankruptcy Court converted 
Jenkins' rights against Peterson into rights in the property. This is an untenable position, 
however, as the bankruptcy court sought only to preserve Jenkins' existing rights to the 
land, not to give him any new rights to the land. Instead, the court and the parties merely 
agreed that Jenkins' rights to the property should not be determined in the bankruptcy 
court forum. R. 179, 182, 184. Therefore, the court below erred by granting a new lien 
in the Subject Property. 
In his Appellee's Brief, Jenkins uses the "subject to all liens and interests" language 
from the Trustee's Deed to support his argument that the sale could have no effect at all 
on Jenkins' rights. The bankruptcy court and the parties specifically noted that Jenkins' 
interest in the Subject Property must be determined by the state court. R. 182. Any lien 
or interest would necessarily have arisen from the Agreement. As the Agreement did not 
give Jenkins any valid interest in the property, the Trustee's Deed affected a complete 
conveyance of Peterson's interest to Vetere. In the alternative, if a lien did exist as a 
result of the Agreement, the terms of the lien would be limited to 25% of the sales price 
by that Agreement. Thus, it is the Agreement that affects Jenkins' rights, not the 
Trustee's Deed. 
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Instead of seeking to prove that a valid lien exists, Jenkins merely assumes that he 
holds a lien on the Subject Property. A party seeking to enforce a lien has the burden of 
proving the validity of the lien. See 1st Choice Bank v. Fisher Mechanical Contractors, 
Inc., 15 P.3d 1100, 1104 (Colo. App. 2000).4 By simply assuming the validity of the lien, 
Jenkins has failed to meet his burden of proof. Furthermore, Vetere has shown that the 
plain meaning of the Agreement creetted no valid lien on the Subject Property, or 
alternatively, even if a valid lien is assumed, the Agreement created no lien that secured 
any more than $2,000. See infra part V; Appellant's Opening Brief, parts II.A & IILA. 
Therefore, the court erred in ordering foreclosure of the Subject Property, or alternatively 
erred in its ordering foreclosure for more than $2,000. 
III. VETERE MAKES NO NEW ARGUMENTS ON THIS APPEAL. 
Vetere's argument "that there existed no liquidated sum due or owing to Mr. 
Jenkins" was, contrary to Jenkins' assertion, adequately raised below. Appellee's Brief, 
12. Of course, "defenses and claims not raised [below] . . . cannot be considered for the 
first time on appeal." Bangerter v. Poulton, 663 P.2d 100, 102 (Utah 1983). See also 
State v. Lopez, 886 P.2d 1105, 1113 (Utah 1994); State v. Irwin, 924 P.2d 5, 7 (Utah App. 
1996). However, in examining the record, the centrality of the "no sum certain" 
argument is readily apparent. First, the record is replete with arguments that the 
4
 It should be noted that the determination of whether a valid lien exists is purely an issue 
of law because it depends only on the interpretation of the plain meaning of the 
Agreement. Wagner v. Clifton, 2002 UT 109, \ 12, 62 P.3d 440 (quoting WebBank v. 
Am. Gen. Annuity Serv. Corp., 2002 UT 88, If 19, 54 P.3d 1139). 
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Agreement did not create a security interest in the Subject Property, but instead merely 
affected an assignment of proceeds. Second, the dispute both on appeal and in the court 
below has essentially centered on what amount, if any, was secured by an interest in the 
Subject Property. These two observations, taken together, effectively dispel any notion 
that this is a new or in Jenkins words a "novel argument." Finally, Vetere argued below 
that there was no "specific amount owing" because he argued that the Agreement did not 
create a valid loan. Loans, mortgages, and trust deeds can all be characterized as 
obligations requiring a "specific amount owing." The entirety of subsection II.B of 
Vetere's original memorandum was devoted to proving that the Agreement did not 
constitute a valid loan agreement, R.228-29, thereby preserving the sum certain issue for 
appeal. 
Vetere argued both in his memoranda and at the summary judgment hearing that 
the Agreement did not create a security interest in the land. For example, in his first 
memorandum below, Vetere specifically distinguished instruments that are typically used 
to convey an interest in real property—warranty deeds, quitclaim deeds, trust deeds, and 
mortgages—from the instrument at issue. R.227. Also, in that same memorandum, 
Vetere stated that "[bjecause the Security Agreement did not give Jenkins an interest in 
the land (but only in the profits) Jenkins cannot ask for . . . foreclosure on the Parcels." 
R.230. Furthermore, at the summary judgment hearing, Vetere argued that Jenkins' 
"only claim to the property that we're fighting about here . . . is that when it's sold they 
get some money out of it." R.331, 29. Thus, it is clear from the record that Vetere 
argued in the proceedings below that the Agreement affected only an assignment of 
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proceeds, and therefore did not create a security interest in the land. In other words, the 
Agreement was ineffective in securing the transaction with an interest in the land. 
The lack of a sum certain was also discussed extensively in the proceedings below. 
In fact, almost the entire legal dispute between the parties has centered on determining, if 
possible, the specific amount owing. Numerous places in the record show a lack of 
certainty as to what amount is secured by an interest in the property. For example, in his 
initial memorandum in support of summary judgment, Jenkins argues that he "is entitled 
to priority repayment of his $12,000.00 as restitution default damages under black letter 
contract law." R.113. Although Jenkins' does not present a single valid argument as to 
why $12,000 should be secured in the land, this passage clearly shows his contention that 
the secured sum is $12,000. In contrast, Vetere has consistently argued that no damages 
are secured, or alternatively that at most $2,000 in damages were secured. See, e.g. 
R.283-84. Thus, many of the arguments made below were made based on the fact that 
there was no ascertainable specific amount owing. 
Finally, Vetere argued below that the Agreement did not effect a loan secured by 
an interest in the Subject Property. Jenkins claims that Vetere makes a new argument on 
In a particularly puzzling argument, Jenkins mistakenly states that Vetere argued in his 
Appellant's Opening Brief that the Agreement affected a conveyance of Peterson's 
interest. Appellee's Brief, 4. Apparently, Jenkins construed the language "assignment of 
proceeds" to mean "conveyance of an undivided fee interest in the property." Id. at n.3. 
The two phrases, of course, describe two very different transactions. An assignment of 
proceeds transaction requires that any money (proceeds) obtained from a sale be given 
(assigned) to the designated party. A conveyance of an undivided fee interest in a 
property, in contrast, gives the whole "bundle of sticks." Thus, where Vetere argued that 
the Agreement affected an assignment of proceeds, he did not go against any argument 
that he made below. 
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appeal; however, the alleged new argument is that the Agreement did not effect an 
obligation with a specific amount owing secured by an interest in the Subject Property. A 
loan and an obligation with a specific amount owing are essentially the same thing, and 
consequently, the arguments are also the same. The following quotation from Vetere's 
initial memorandum below is especially illustrative: in discussing whether the $12,000 
was given as a loan, and therefore whether there was a debt owing, Vetere stated, "[t]he 
Security Agreement did not contain a time frame within which the money would have to 
be paid back, amount to be paid, amount of interest to accrue, or a plan for payments to 
be made to Jenkins." R.229 (emphasis added). Looking at the no loan argument below, 
and the no sum certain argument on appeal, it is readily apparent that they are the same 
argument. In a nutshell, the only way the district court could have logically concluded 
that a lien existed on the Subject Property for $12,000, is to find that the Agreement 
affected a secured loan of $12,000 from Jenkins to Peterson. Just as he did below, 
however, Vetere argues that there was no loan, or in other words, no specific amount 
owing, and thus, that there can be no lien on the Subject Property. Thus, because an 
entire subsection of Vetere's initial memorandum below was devoted to the loan 
argument, R.228-29, Vetere may certainly raise this argument again on appeal. 
IV, TO EFFECT A VALID MORTGAGE, THE SPECIFIC AMOUNT MUST 
BE ASCERTAINABLE UPON CREATION OF THE MORTGAGE. 
The Agreement did not create a valid mortgage under Utah law because either 
there was no specific amount owing when the mortgage was allegedly created, or 
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alternatively, any mortgage which might have been created was released upon sale of the 
subject property by the Bankruptcy Trustee. In Bangerter v. Poulton, the Utah Supreme 
Court held that "to establish a valid trust deed or mortgage, a legal debt or obligation with 
a specific amount owing must exist." 663 P.2d at 101.6 Jenkins cites a general rule from 
American Jurisprudence that is plainly in conflict with the rule espoused by the court in 
Bangerter. Appellee's Brief, 13. American Jurisprudence, of course, is not binding 
authority, and in this case, it is not even an accurate representation of Utah law. Perhaps 
some jurisdictions do not require a debt with specific amount owing to create a valid 
mortgage; however, in order to promote clarity in recording, many states, including Utah, 
have chosen to require such a sum certain. See, e.g. Bangerter, 663 P.2d at 101; Smith v. 
Haertel, 125 Colo. 348, 244 P.2d 377, 379 (1952); E.E.E., Inc., 318 N.W.2d at 106. 
Essentially, a person who wants to purchase real estate should be able to look at the 
Jenkins' arguments against the Bangerter rule can only be characterized as weak. He 
says that "Mr. Vetere's reliance upon the language . . . in Bangerter . . . is seriously 
flawed," but fails to say in what way. He notes that "a cursory perusal of [Bangerter] 
will only bolster" his position, but does not cite a single instance where it does so. 
Finally, he attempts to cast aside a Utah Supreme Court decision and replace the decision 
with a supposedly "well accepted [sic] and uniformly applied legal principle" from Am. 
Jur. 
Jenkins also cites a North Dakota decision which, interestingly enough, directly 
contradicts his position. Appellee's Brief, 13. The North Dakota Supreme Court held 
that "any obligation capable of being reduced to a money value may be secured by a 
mortgage." E.E.E.y Inc. v. Hanson, 318 N.W.2d 101, 106 (N.D. 1982). In the instant 
case, "25% of the selling price on any parcel(s) sold" could not be "reduced to a money 
value" until a sale had occurred. Thus, under either the Utah or North Dakota rule, the 
mortgage is invalid. 
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recorded documents to learn the exact amount and character of all encumbrances on the 
property. Smith, 244 P.2d at 379. 
A. Jenkins' Post-Breach Damage Claim Does Not Qualify As a Sum 
Certain Because a Sum Certain Must Be Ascertainable from the 
Recorded Document. 
Twelve thousand dollars cannot be the sum certain because, if it were, the 
recordation policy behind the sum certain rule would be frustrated, and an inequity would 
result. Jenkins adamantly claims that $12,000 is the specific amount owing, but cites no 
authority to support this contention. Apparently, Jenkins believes that the law only 
requires any certain sum at any time. Thus, Jenkins argues that a mortgage, invalid for 
lack of a sum certain at its inception, somehow becomes valid when there is a breach 
allowing for an ascertainable amount of damages. This is simply not a plausible reading 
of the sum certain rule. The recordation policy behind the sum certain rule would be 
completely frustrated if a purchaser had no way of knowing the nature or extent of an 
encumbrance. Such an interpretation would also create an inequity in the present case as 
Mr. Vetere could not have known when he purchased the land from the Bankruptcy 
Trustee that it supposedly secured a $12,000 damage claim. As discussed in his Opening 
Appellate Brief, Vetere purchased the land from the Bankruptcy estate for $8,000 with 
notice only of a disputed encumbrance, or at most, an encumbrance of $2,000 (25% of 
the sale price). See Appellant's Opening Brief, 16-17. 
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B. The Rule of Bill Nay & Sons Excavating v. Neeley Construction 
Company Does Not Apply to the Instant Case Because the Facts Are 
Clearly Distinguishable. 
Jenkins relies on Bill Nay & Sons Excavating v. Neeley Construction Company, 
677 P.2D 1120 (1984) (hereinafter "Bill Nay"), to support a number of his claims, but he 
misapplies language from the case,8 and in any event, Bill Nay is clearly distinguishable 
from the instant case. The facts of Bill Nay are as follows: Neeley Construction 
purchased real estate from the Manti Improvement of Business Association. Plaintiff Bill 
Nay subsequently obtained a $9,000 judgment against Neeley Construction. Neeley 
Construction was insolvent, and in order to prevent a lien on the property, they arranged 
to have the land transferred to a third party. Because Neeley Construction had supplied 
the entire consideration for the land, the court held that the third party merely held the 
land in constructive trust for Neeley Construction, and that the land could therefore be 
reached by Neeley Construction's creditors, including Bill Nay. 
The instant case is distinguished on a number of points. First, the central issue in 
Bill Nay was whether the fraudulent party had an interest in property such that the 
defrauded party could attach a lien to it, Id. at 1122, not whether there was a valid 
On page 13 of his brief, Jenkins misuses Bill Nay. To support his contention that "Utah 
Courts have consistently recognized and enforced . . . secured interests in real property to 
secure performance of any number of obligations[,]" Jenkins quotes the following 
language from Bill Nay: "The interest of a purchaser under a real estate contract is an 
interest in real property that can be mortgaged." 677 P.2d at 1121. However, the court in 
that case was merely stating that, where a purchaser has provided the consideration under 
a contract to purchase land, they have a foreclosable interest in real property. Thus, the 
case does not speak to what obligations may be secured by a mortgage, but speaks only to 
the determination of whether a party has a foreclosable interest. In this case, it is 
indisputable that neither Peterson nor his Bankruptcy Estate has any foreclosable interest 
in the Subject Property, having sold it to Vetere for $8,000. 
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existing lien which is the issue in the instant case. Furthermore, the third party in Bill 
Nay had no valid interest in the property. Therefore, asserting a lien against the property 
presented no inequity as against the third party. Also, Neeley Construction was both the 
owner of the property, and the fraudulent party in the action. In contrast, asserting a lien 
against the Subject Property in the instant case would work a great inequity against 
Vetere. He does have a valid interest in what was formerly Peterson's interest, because 
he paid $8,000 to buy it. Furthermore, Vetere was in no way involved with Peterson's 
fraudulent transactions. Thus, where it was just to impose a lien against Neeley 
Construction in Bill Nay, it would be patently unjust to impose a lien against Vetere's 
property. 
C. Jenkins Raises New Statutory Arguments on This Appeal, but Even If 
These Arguments Are Not Barred, They Are Unpersuasive. 
Jenkins also cites Bill Nay to support a new argument that Utah Code section 78-
22-1, and the Utah Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act apply to this case, but again fails to 
articulate a single argument as to how they apply. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-22-1 (2000); 
id. §§ 25-6-1 to -13 (2000). These claims are inadmissible on this appeal because they 
were neither pled nor argued in the district court,9 but even if the Court were to consider 
them, neither of these statutes applies to the instant case. 
9
 Jenkins did not raise either of these claims at the district court level. Although Jenkins 
asserts the court's authority to affirm on any grounds, there has recently been some 
scholarly commentary suggesting that allowing new arguments by Appellees, but not 
Appellants, may be a violation of basic due process rights. D. Scott Crook, Affirming the 
Untested: Affirming a Trial Based on Issues Raised Sua Sponte, UTAH B.J., Oct. 2001, at 
10, 11. Indeed, this Court has squarely refused to rule on new grounds unless the new 
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First, section 78-22-1 outlines the procedures for and limitations on attaching a 
lien on property to satisfy a judgment. Id. § 78-22-1. Jenkins is not, however, seeking to 
attach a lien to satisfy a judgment; he claims an interest in the Subject Property through a 
lien that purportedly preexists this court action. The Order from the district court did not 
impose a judgment against Vetere, but merely recognized the supposed validity of an 
existing lien, and ordered foreclosure on that lien. R. 306-09. Furthermore, section 78-
22-1 allows for attachment of a lien on any "real property of the judgment debtor" UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 78-22-1 (emphasis added), and Vetere is certainly not a judgment debtor as 
summary judgment was granted dismissing all claims against Vetere personally and as a 
member of the alleged partnership.10 
Second, the Utah Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act does not apply because, among 
other reasons, the transfer from the Bankruptcy Estate to Vetere was a "good faith 
transfer" under section 25-6-9 of the code. The Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act seeks 
to remedy situations similar to Bill Nay where a person transfers property in an effort to 
prevent a creditor from attaching a lien to the property. UTAH CODE ANN. § 25-6-1 to -
grounds for affirmance are (1) apparent on the record, and (2) thoroughly briefed. State 
v. Montoya, 937 P.2d 145, 149-150 (Utah App. 1997). Jenkins' claims fail on both of 
these elements, and are therefore inadmissible on this appeal. 
10
 In Footnote 4 of Jenkins' Appellee's Brief, he misrepresents the circumstances 
surrounding the voluntary withdrawal of his claims against Mr. Vetere personally. The 
voluntary withdrawal was simply that, a voluntary withdrawal. It was not a conditional 
withdrawal as Jenkins now attempts to characterize it. See R. 331, 44-45. Furthermore, 
Jenkins' threat to reopen the claims against Vetere is especially hollow where the final 
order from the District Court signed by Jenkins dismissed those claims with prejudice. R. 
309. 
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13. As discussed in the previous paragraphs, the instant case is clearly distinguishable 
from this scenario. Under the act, a transfer is fraudulent 
if the debtor made the transfer . . . (a) with actual intent to hinder, delay, or 
defraud any creditor of the debtor; or (b) without receiving a reasonably 
equivalent value in exchange for the transfer or obligation; and the debtor: 
(i) was engaged or was about to engage in a business or a transaction for 
which the remaining assets of the debtor were unreasonably small in 
relation to the business or transaction; or (ii) intended to incur, or believed 
or reasonably should have believed that he would incur, debts beyond his 
ability to pay as they became due. 
The inapplicability of this statute becomes clear when you consider the absurdity 
resulting from an attempt to apply the act to the facts of this case. Such an attempt would 
entail, arguendo, Peterson transferring an interest to Jenkins in order to prevent the 
creditor (Jenkins?) from getting to the interest in the property. Thus, the absurdity is that 
Jenkins would receive the interest in order to keep himself from attaching a lien to the 
interest. 
Jenkins' only other possible application of the act would require him to 
characterize the transfer from the Bankruptcy Trustee to Vetere as fraudulent. Section 
25-6-9 of the code, however, exempts good faith transfers from the remedial provisions 
of the act. As part of the good faith exclusion, that section specifically exempts any 
transfer "for a reasonably equivalent value," and precludes enforcement as "against any 
subsequent transferee . . . ." Id. Therefore, if Jenkins argues that the alleged transfer 
from Peterson to Jenkins was fraudulent, the act does not apply in this motion for 
summary judgment because Vetere is a "subsequent transferee." Alternatively, if Jenkins 
argues that the bankruptcy transfer was fraudulent, the act does not apply because the 
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bankruptcy court specifically noted thai $8,000 was a reasonable purchase price for the 
Subject Property. R. 192. 
Thus, even if the court decides to consider Jenkins' new argument, it does not 
avail Jenkins as neither of the statutes applies to the instant facts. 
V. THE AGREEMENT DOES NOT EFFECTIVELY CONVEY ANY 
INTEREST IN THE SUBJECT PROPERTY, BUT IF IT DOES, IT 
CONVEYS, AT MOST, A SECURITY INTEREST SECURING ONLY 25% 
OF THE PROCEEDS FROM ANY SALE. 
Ultimately, the district court erred principally by not giving effect to the plain 
meaning of the Agreement. "If the language within the four comers of the contract is 
unambiguous, the parties' intentions are determined from the plain meaning of the 
contractual language, and the contract may be interpreted as a matter of law." Wagner, 
2002 UT 109, H 12 (quoting WebBank, 2002 UT 88, % 19).11 The language of the 
Agreement is plain and unambiguous on its face, and thus, the intent of the parties must 
be derived from that plain meaning. Therefore, any evidence that Jenkins belatedly 
offers beyond the Agreement itself is barred from consideration. 
Jenkins implies that there is ambiguity in the Agreement, and notes that any ambiguity 
needs to be construed against the drafter. Appellee's Brief, 19 (citing Jones, Waldo, 
Holbrook & McDonough v. Dawson, 923 P.2d 1366, 1372 (Utah 1996)). While this is 
the law, it has no relevance in this case where there is no ambiguity. If there had been 
any ambiguity, summary judgment could not have been granted, and a trial would be 
necessary to hear testimony as to the parties' intent. However, even if there were 
ambiguity, Jenkins cannot draw any connection between Peterson, who drafted the 
document, and Vetere. Thus, there is no reason to construe the alleged ambiguities 
against Vetere, because he is certainly not the drafter. In fact, he did not even know that 
the Agreement existed until more than six months after it was signed by Jenkins and 
Peterson. See Appellant's Opening Brief, 3-4. 
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As the plain meaning of the Agreement is central to this appeal, a thorough 
exposition of that plain meaning is in order. A copy of the Agreement is attached as 
Addendum Two of Appellant's Opening Brief, but for the convenience of the Court, the 
relevant language from the Agreement is quoted below. 
SECURITY AGREEMENT 
FOR THE SUM OF TWELVE THOUSAND DOLLARS ($12,000), 
KENT PETERSON hereby grants to LARRY K. JENKINS an undivided 
interest in approximately 30 acres of vacant land located in Grand County, 
Utah. Parcel #1 consists of 25 acres +/- and Parcel #2 has 5 acres +/-; and, 
they are described below: 
[the Agreement here gives the property descriptions of Parcels #'s 1 and 2] 
KENT PETERSON AND LARRY K. JENKINS HEREBY AGREE 
that for the above-mentioned consideration and the undivided security 
interest in the property granted, Mr. Jenkins shall receive 25.0% of the 
selling price on any parcel(s) sold from the parcels listed above. This 
percentage due Mr. Jenkins shall be made part of the seller's closing 
instructions to the title company; and, upon successful closing on all or part 
of the subject properties, Mr. Jenkins shall receive the amount due him 
within three business days from Settlement Date. 
[the Agreement was signed by Kent Peterson, Larry K. Jenkins, and Rennie 
L. Acerson, Notary Public] 
A. If The Agreement Effectively Conveyed Any Interest at All, It 
Conveyed Only a Security Interest in the Subject Property* 
The Agreement could not and did not effectively convey any interest in the 
Subject Property because it fails to specify a specific amount owing, but if, arguendo, it 
did convey an interest, the plain language of the document limits the conveyed interest to 
a security interest. The Agreement plainly did not convey a fee interest for two reasons: 
(1) the title of the document is inconsistent with a conveyance of property; and (2), the 
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second clause of the Agreement must be given effect as limiting any grant in the first 
clause. 
First, the title of the document is evidence that the parties did not intend for the 
instrument to convey an interest in property. An interest in property is generally 
conveyed through warranty deeds, quitclaim deeds, trust deeds, and mortgages. See 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-1-1 et. seq. (2000). Noticeably absent from this list is "Security 
Agreements." As such, a person reading the title of the document could not reasonably 
believe that it was intended to convey an interest in real property. 
Second, even if the document is read as a deed, the plain language of the 
Agreement cannot be read as a conveyance in fee of Peterson's former interest in the 
property. In Utah, "the whole deed and every part thereof is to be taken into 
consideration in determining the intent of the grantor, and clauses in the deed subsequent 
to the granting clause are given effect so as to curtail, limit, or qualify the estate conveyed 
in the granting clause." Haynes v. Hunt, 85 P.2d 861, 863 (Utah 1939). Admittedly, if 
one reads only the first clause of the Agreement, he or she might think that Peterson had 
conveyed some unspecified interest in the land.12 However, the second clause can only 
be read to limit any such grant. Where the second clause refers to "the undivided 
security interest in the property granted," (emphasis added), it is impossible to read the 
12
 Jenkins argues, as he did below, that a conveyance of any unspecified interest is 
effective in conveying all of that interest. He says that this rule is "well recognized under 
Utah law, as it was under common law," but again fails to cite a single source 
substantiating this claim. Appellee's Brief, 16. Where a party makes an argument, but 
fails to cite any sources to support it, the court need not even address the argument. See 
UTAH R. APP. P. 24(a)(9); Walker v. U.S. General Inc., 916 P.2d 903, 908 (Utah 1996). 
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Agreement as conveying an interest in fee because the second clause must be "given 
effect so as to . . . l imit . . . the granting clause." Haynes, 85 P.2d at 863. 
In short, notwithstanding the omission of the word "security" in the initial clause, 
the interest granted in the first clause can only be a security interest. Furthermore, such a 
security interest would be ineffective because there must be a "specific amount owing" to 
effect a valid mortgage or trust deed.13 The plain meaning of the Agreement manifests 
the parties' intent to convey only a security interest to Jenkins. A security interest is 
therefore the maximum interest possibly granted. Of course, if a security interest, or 
mortgage, was granted, it would be ineffective for lack of a sum certain. Therefore, 
Jenkins has no valid claim to the Subject Property. 
B. If the Agreement Effectively Granted a Security Interest, the Plain 
Language of the Agreement Limits the Security to "25.0% of the 
selling price on any parcel(s) sold." 
Even assuming that the Agreement was effective in granting a valid security 
interest, the district court erred in ordering foreclosure on the property in the amount of 
$12,000 because the plain meaning of the instrument limits the secured amount to 25% of 
the proceeds from any sale. The second clause of the Agreement clearly defines the 
benefit that Jenkins sought from this bargain. It says that "Mr. Jenkins shall receive 
25.0% of the selling price on any parcel(s) sold from the parcels above." Thus, Jenkins 
and Peterson entered into an investment contract. Jenkins invested $12,000, and in 
return, he was promised 25% of the proceeds from any sale. Therefore, if anything was 
13
 See discussion supra part IV. 
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secured with a security interest in the Subject Property, it was Peterson's obligation to 
pay 25% of the proceeds from a sale.14 As Peterson's interest was sold to Vetere for 
$8,000, Jenkins is, at most, entitled to 25% of the sale price, or $2,000. Thus, the district 
court erred because the plain language of the instrument cannot be stretched to allow for 
a $12,000 award secured in the Subject Property. 
Conclusion 
In reversing the decision below, this Court will not damage Jenkins in any way. 
He will retain all claims against the party responsible for his losses, Peterson. The 
bankruptcy court has already removed the temporary stay, and claims of fraud are not 
dischargeable in bankruptcy in any case. Regardless of this Court's decision on this 
appeal, Jenkins retains all rights to continue to pursue his claims against Peterson. 
The Court should therefore reverse the judgment below and grant judgment for 
Vetere dismissing Jenkins' remaining claims to the Subject Property. The Court should 
further award Vetere costs and attorney fees because Vetere has been forced to expend 
considerable resources to defend himself against Jenkins' baseless claims. 
14
 As pointed out in Appellant's Opening Brief, this presents a paradox where the owner 
of the property is not the person who owes money to the claimant. A substantially 
similar situation was faced by the Florida Court of Appeals in Secretary of Veterans 
Affairs v. Roma Food Enterprises of Florida, Inc.. 840 S.2d 1066 (Fla. App. 2003). The 
Florida court held that, because of this incongruity, the agreement in that case merely 
created an assignment of proceeds, and the claimant had no right in the property. Id. at 
1066-67. Interestingly, even though Mr,. Vetere cited and argued the applicability of this 
case in his Opening Appellate Brief, Jenkins fails to address this case in his response. 
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Dated this si^S day of October, 2003. 
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Certificate of Service 
On this of October, 2003, two true and correct copies of the foregoing 
Petitioner's Opening Brief were mailed, United States mail, postage prepaid, to the 
following: 
David Crabtree, Esq. 
10714 South Jordan Gateway, Suite 300 
South Jordan, Utah 84095 
Kent Peterson 
9519 South 4030 West #2 
South Jordan, Utah 84095 
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